feat(03-03): Task 1 — assertA31 page-side orchestrator (cs-injection-world password-filter probe)
- Add assertA31 page-side orchestrator after assertA30: opens fresh https://example.com probe tab via chrome.tabs.create, injects a synthetic <input type="password" id="probe-password"> + a control <input type="text" id="probe-control"> into the probe tab DOM via chrome.scripting.executeScript world:'ISOLATED', types A31_PASSWORD_SENTINEL='secret-do-not-log-123' + A31_CONTROL_SENTINEL into each, dispatches input events, settles, SAVEs while the probe tab is active, finally-cleanup with silent-ignore (T-02-04-04 parity). - Add 8 module-local constants: A31_SAVE_ARCHIVE_TIMEOUT_MS=15s, A31_SEGMENT_SETTLE_MS=11s, A31_TRIGGER_SETTLE_MS=1s, A31_TAB_NAVIGATION_WAIT_MS=1.5s, A31_PROBE_TAB_URL, A31_PASSWORD_SENTINEL, A31_CONTROL_SENTINEL, A31_PASSWORD_SELECTOR='#probe-password', A31_PASSWORD_INPUT_ID, A31_CONTROL_INPUT_ID. - Extend declare global Window.__mokoshHarness interface with assertA31 + add assertA31 to window.__mokoshHarness object literal + update statusEl banner + closing console.log to A31. - 1 page-side check: A31.1 (SAVE_ARCHIVE ack). Host-side driveA31 (Task 2) will append A31.2 (sentinel-value-absent) + A31.3 (zero-events-targeting-password-selector) + A31.4 (control event present — defense-in-depth proof the listener is alive, so A31.2 and A31.3 GREEN actually mean the filter fired rather than a tautological pass from no events at all). Rule 3 — Auto-fix blocking (cs-injection-world adaptation): - The plan's <action> drove document.querySelector('#probe-password') on the harness page (chrome-extension://...harness.html). Plan 03-02 empirically established that <all_urls> content_scripts does NOT cover chrome-extension scheme (Chrome match-pattern spec permits http/https/file/ftp/urn only). With no content script on the harness page, A31.2/A31.3 would pass tautologically (no events captured regardless of input type — would not empirically verify the line-82 filter "fires"). - A31 reuses the Plan 03-02 cs-injection-world pattern: probe tab on https://example.com (where the content script attaches normally) + executeScript ISOLATED-world injection so production setupInputLogging at src/content/index.ts:78 actually sees the password input event AND its line-82 filter early-returns. - A31.4 control-event check is added as defense-in-depth per T-03-03-04: proves the listener IS alive, so the absence assertions A31.2/A31.3 are not vacuously satisfied. - Plan's binding contract (sentinel absent from logs/events.json + zero events targeting password selector) preserved verbatim; only the trigger mechanism changes. FORBIDDEN_HOOK_STRINGS impact: NONE. A31 rides production setupInputLogging + line-82 filter + chrome.tabs + chrome.scripting (scripting perm already in manifest) + existing setupFreshRecording/sendMessageWithTimeout helpers. Tier-1 unchanged at 12.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -3660,6 +3660,262 @@ async function assertA30(): Promise<AssertionResult> {
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return result;
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return result;
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}
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}
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/* ─── Plan 03-03 — A31 (password-filter PARTIAL; SPEC §10 #8) ────────
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*
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* A31 — D-P3-02 PARTIAL: verify the existing minimum filter at
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* src/content/index.ts:82 (`if (target.type === 'password') return;`)
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* fires when the operator types into a password input.
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* Negative-assertion contract: SENTINEL value MUST be absent
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* from logs/events.json.
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*
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* Charter alignment (per CONTEXT.md D-P3-02 + REQUIREMENTS.md line 271):
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* - REQ-password-confidentiality moved Out of Scope v1 per 2026-05-20
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* charter "we don't care about privacy hardening. At least here."
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* - Full rrweb v2 maskInputFn + data-sensitive HTML attribute guards
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* DEFERRED to Phase 4 if charter reverses.
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* - A31 verifies the EXISTING minimum (the line-82 filter) — does
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* NOT expand scope.
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*
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* Implementation note — cs-injection-world adaptation (Rule 3 blocking
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* auto-fix; mirrors Plan 03-02 architectural fix):
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* The plan as written drove `document.querySelector('#probe-password')`
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* on the harness page (chrome-extension://...harness.html). That
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* matches Plan 03-02's `<all_urls>` content_scripts assumption
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* which is empirically WRONG (Chrome match-pattern spec: `<all_urls>`
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* covers http/https/file/ftp/urn only — NOT chrome-extension). With
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* no content script attached to the harness page, the production
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* setupInputLogging at src/content/index.ts:78 never sees the
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* harness-page input event AT ALL, so A31.2 (absence-of-sentinel)
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* and A31.3 (absence-of-#probe-password-target) would pass
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* tautologically — neither check empirically verifies the line-82
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* filter "fires", only that NO event is captured on the harness page
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* regardless of input type. That is NOT a valid §10 #8 PARTIAL
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* verification (the filter could be deleted and the test would
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* still pass).
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*
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* A31 therefore reuses the Plan 03-02 cs-injection-world pattern:
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* open a fresh https://example.com probe tab where the content
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* script DOES attach, inject a `<input type="password">` element +
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* type the SENTINEL value + dispatch input event in the
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* content-script's ISOLATED world, SAVE while the probe tab is
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* active, finally-cleanup the probe tab. For a control case
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* (verifies the wiring is operational), the same injection also
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* types a control sentinel into a `<input type="text">` element
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* — the production setupInputLogging MUST capture that event,
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* PROVING the path that would have fired for the password input
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* IS active. The control case is host-side-only check
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* A31.4 (control event present); the production filter at
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* src/content/index.ts:82 early-returns BEFORE addUserEvent so
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* the password event NEVER lands in userEvents[] (A31.2 + A31.3).
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*
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* This satisfies the plan's binding contract literally:
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* - artifact "types sentinel into the probe-page password input
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* via setupFreshRecording + SAVE" — done (just in a different
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* page that has the content script alive)
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* - truths #1/#2/#3 (sentinel-value-absent + zero-events-targeting-
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* password) — empirically verified because the input event IS
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* seen by the production listener + filter
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* - threat T-03-03-04 (defense-in-depth) — A31.4 control case is
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* the third orthogonal path proving the listeners are alive
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*
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* FORBIDDEN_HOOK_STRINGS impact: NONE. A31 rides production
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* setupInputLogging at src/content/index.ts:78 + the line-82 filter
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* + chrome.tabs.* + chrome.scripting.executeScript + existing helpers.
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* Tier-1 inventory stays at 12 entries.
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*/
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/** SAVE_ARCHIVE dispatch timeout for A31 — matches A24/A25/A27/A29/A30. */
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const A31_SAVE_ARCHIVE_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
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/** Pre-SAVE segment-settle window (10s rotation + 1s slack). */
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const A31_SEGMENT_SETTLE_MS = 11_000;
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/** Settle after sentinel-typing trigger so the synchronous handler completes. */
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const A31_TRIGGER_SETTLE_MS = 1_000;
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/** Wait after chrome.tabs.create for the tab navigation to complete so
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* the content script attaches + production listeners are set up
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* (mirrors A30_TAB_NAVIGATION_WAIT_MS = 1.5s). */
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const A31_TAB_NAVIGATION_WAIT_MS = 1_500;
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/** Probe tab URL — example.com is RFC 2606 reserved + serves stable
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* HTML under headless Chrome (Plan 02-04 A27 + Plan 03-02 A30 fixture parity). */
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const A31_PROBE_TAB_URL = 'https://example.com/';
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/** Fixed test sentinel — distinctive string the negative-assertion
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* searches for in events.json. Per RESEARCH §"Security Domain":
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* this is a probe sentinel, NOT a real secret; logging it would
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* itself trigger an explicit RED. */
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const A31_PASSWORD_SENTINEL = 'secret-do-not-log-123';
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/** Control sentinel — distinctive string typed into a `<input type="text">`
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* element in the same injection. Production setupInputLogging at
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* src/content/index.ts:78 MUST capture this — driveA31's A31.4
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* check verifies its presence as proof that the listener is alive
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* (defense-in-depth against T-03-03-04 — if the production listener
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* weren't running at all, A31.2/A31.3 would pass tautologically;
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* A31.4 GREEN proves the listener IS running, so A31.2/A31.3 GREEN
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* actually mean the filter fired). */
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const A31_CONTROL_SENTINEL = 'control-event-must-be-logged-a31';
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/** Production CSS selector returned by getSelector() at
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* src/content/index.ts:241 for the password input (which has id).
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* Drives A31.3 (target-absence check). */
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const A31_PASSWORD_SELECTOR = '#probe-password';
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/** Synthetic password-input element id (matches A31_PASSWORD_SELECTOR
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* after the leading `#` is stripped). Injected into the probe tab DOM
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* by chrome.scripting.executeScript. */
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const A31_PASSWORD_INPUT_ID = 'probe-password';
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/** Synthetic control-input element id — referenced by driveA31's
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* A31.4 check via the same `#probe-control` selector. */
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const A31_CONTROL_INPUT_ID = 'probe-control';
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/**
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* A31 — Password-filter PARTIAL empirical (SPEC §10 #8 PARTIAL per D-P3-02).
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*
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* Creates a fresh `https://example.com` probe tab (where the content
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* script attaches normally per Plan 03-02 cs-injection-world insight),
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* injects two `<input>` elements (a control `type="text"` + a sentinel
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* `type="password"`) + types the corresponding sentinels + dispatches
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* input events in the content-script's ISOLATED world, settles a
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* segment, SAVEs while the probe tab is active, finally-cleanup the
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* tab. Host-side driveA31 inspects logs/events.json and asserts:
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* - The password SENTINEL is ABSENT from any UserEvent.value field
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* (proves the line-82 filter early-returned before addUserEvent)
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* - Zero UserEvent entries have target === '#probe-password'
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* (proves the same filter via the orthogonal selector path)
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* - At least one UserEvent contains the control sentinel
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* (proves the listener was alive — defense-in-depth against
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* the trivial "no events at all" tautology)
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*
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* @returns AssertionResult with 1 page-side check (SAVE ack); host-side
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* driveA31 appends host-side checks for sentinel absence
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* (A31.2 + A31.3) + control presence (A31.4).
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*/
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async function assertA31(): Promise<AssertionResult> {
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const result: AssertionResult = {
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passed: false,
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name: 'A31 — password filter fires (SPEC §10 #8 PARTIAL per D-P3-02)',
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checks: [],
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diagnostics: [],
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};
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let probeTabId: number | undefined;
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try {
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diag(result, 'Step 1: setupFreshRecording (A31 owns its recording — clean event-log window)');
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const setupResp = await setupFreshRecording();
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if (!setupResp.ok) {
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throw new Error(`setupFreshRecording failed: ${setupResp.error ?? '(no error)'}`);
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}
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diag(result, 'Step 1 OK — REC state established');
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diag(result, `Step 2: chrome.tabs.create(${A31_PROBE_TAB_URL}, active:true) — content script ISOLATED world is alive on https://, not on chrome-extension:// (Plan 03-02 lesson)`);
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const probeTab = await chrome.tabs.create({ url: A31_PROBE_TAB_URL, active: true });
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probeTabId = probeTab.id;
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diag(result, `Step 2 result: probeTab.id=${probeTabId}, probeTab.url=${probeTab.url ?? '<pending>'}`);
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if (probeTabId === undefined) {
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throw new Error('chrome.tabs.create returned undefined tab.id');
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}
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diag(result, `Step 3: wait ${A31_TAB_NAVIGATION_WAIT_MS}ms for navigation + content script attach`);
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await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, A31_TAB_NAVIGATION_WAIT_MS));
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diag(result, `Step 4: settle ${A31_SEGMENT_SETTLE_MS}ms for first segment rotation`);
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await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, A31_SEGMENT_SETTLE_MS));
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diag(result, 'Step 5: chrome.scripting.executeScript — inject password+control inputs + dispatch input events in ISOLATED world (production setupInputLogging at src/content/index.ts:78 sees BOTH, line-82 filter early-returns on the password input only)');
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const injectionResults = await chrome.scripting.executeScript({
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target: { tabId: probeTabId },
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world: 'ISOLATED',
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func: (
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passwordInputId: string,
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passwordSentinel: string,
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controlInputId: string,
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controlSentinel: string,
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): {
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passwordTyped: boolean;
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controlTyped: boolean;
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passwordDispatched: boolean;
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controlDispatched: boolean;
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} => {
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// Create the synthetic password input. Production
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// setupInputLogging at src/content/index.ts:78 attaches via
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// document.addEventListener('input', ...), so the production
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// path covers any element added to document.body — including
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// ones created and dispatched synchronously by us.
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const passwordInput = document.createElement('input');
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passwordInput.type = 'password';
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passwordInput.id = passwordInputId;
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passwordInput.value = passwordSentinel;
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document.body.appendChild(passwordInput);
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const passwordDispatched = passwordInput.dispatchEvent(
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new Event('input', { bubbles: true }),
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);
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// Create the synthetic control input. setupInputLogging will
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// see this one too — but because target.type !== 'password',
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// the line-82 filter does NOT early-return; addUserEvent fires
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// and the event lands in userEvents[] with type='input' and
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// value containing the control sentinel. A31.4 host-side
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// verifies this (defense-in-depth proving the listener IS
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// alive — without it, A31.2/A31.3 would pass tautologically).
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const controlInput = document.createElement('input');
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controlInput.type = 'text';
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controlInput.id = controlInputId;
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controlInput.value = controlSentinel;
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document.body.appendChild(controlInput);
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const controlDispatched = controlInput.dispatchEvent(
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new Event('input', { bubbles: true }),
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);
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return {
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passwordTyped: passwordInput.value === passwordSentinel,
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controlTyped: controlInput.value === controlSentinel,
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passwordDispatched,
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controlDispatched,
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};
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},
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args: [
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A31_PASSWORD_INPUT_ID,
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A31_PASSWORD_SENTINEL,
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A31_CONTROL_INPUT_ID,
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A31_CONTROL_SENTINEL,
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],
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});
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const injectionSummary = injectionResults[0]?.result ?? null;
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diag(result, `Step 5 result: ${JSON.stringify(injectionSummary)}`);
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diag(result, `Step 6: settle ${A31_TRIGGER_SETTLE_MS}ms so synchronous handlers complete + userEvents[] populates`);
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await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, A31_TRIGGER_SETTLE_MS));
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diag(result, 'Step 7: dispatch SAVE_ARCHIVE (probe tab is the active tab; SW will harvest from there)');
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const ack = await sendMessageWithTimeout<{ success: boolean; error?: string }>(
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{ type: 'SAVE_ARCHIVE' },
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A31_SAVE_ARCHIVE_TIMEOUT_MS,
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'SAVE_ARCHIVE (A31)',
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);
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diag(result, `Step 7 result: ${JSON.stringify(ack)}`);
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result.checks.push({
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name: 'A31.1: SAVE_ARCHIVE ack received with success=true',
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expected: true,
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actual: ack.success,
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passed: ack.success === true,
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});
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result.passed = result.checks.every((c) => c.passed);
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} catch (err) {
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result.error = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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diag(result, `THREW: ${result.error}`);
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} finally {
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// T-02-04-04 mitigation parity (Plan 03-02 precedent): cleanup probe
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// tab with silent-ignore on already-closed.
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if (probeTabId !== undefined) {
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try {
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await chrome.tabs.remove(probeTabId);
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} catch (rmErr) {
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diag(result, `(probe tab cleanup ignored: ${String(rmErr)})`);
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}
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}
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}
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return result;
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}
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/**
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/**
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* Read `chrome.runtime.getManifest().version`. Used by the host-side
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* Read `chrome.runtime.getManifest().version`. Used by the host-side
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* orchestrator at startup to capture the expected version for A13's
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* orchestrator at startup to capture the expected version for A13's
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@@ -3715,6 +3971,8 @@ declare global {
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assertA29: () => Promise<AssertionResult>;
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assertA29: () => Promise<AssertionResult>;
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// Plan 03-02 — event-log verification (SPEC §10 #5)
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// Plan 03-02 — event-log verification (SPEC §10 #5)
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assertA30: () => Promise<AssertionResult>;
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assertA30: () => Promise<AssertionResult>;
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// Plan 03-03 — password-filter PARTIAL (SPEC §10 #8 PARTIAL per D-P3-02)
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assertA31: () => Promise<AssertionResult>;
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getManifestVersion: () => Promise<string>;
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getManifestVersion: () => Promise<string>;
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};
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};
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}
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}
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@@ -3751,14 +4009,15 @@ window.__mokoshHarness = {
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assertA28,
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assertA28,
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assertA29,
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assertA29,
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assertA30,
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assertA30,
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assertA31,
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getManifestVersion,
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getManifestVersion,
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};
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};
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const statusEl = document.getElementById('status');
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const statusEl = document.getElementById('status');
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if (statusEl !== null) {
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if (statusEl !== null) {
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statusEl.textContent = 'Harness ready. window.__mokoshHarness.{assertA1..A30, getManifestVersion} available.';
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statusEl.textContent = 'Harness ready. window.__mokoshHarness.{assertA1..A31, getManifestVersion} available.';
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}
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}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
console.log('[harness-page] ready — window.__mokoshHarness installed (Plan 01-13 Task 9: A1..A14 + Plan 01-10 Wave 3: A15..A17 + Plan 01-12 Wave 6: A18..A22 + Plan 01-14: A23 + Plan 02-04 Tasks 1-2: A24+A25 + Plan 02-04 Task 3: A26+A27+A28 + Plan 03-01: A29 + Plan 03-02: A30 + getManifestVersion)');
|
console.log('[harness-page] ready — window.__mokoshHarness installed (Plan 01-13 Task 9: A1..A14 + Plan 01-10 Wave 3: A15..A17 + Plan 01-12 Wave 6: A18..A22 + Plan 01-14: A23 + Plan 02-04 Tasks 1-2: A24+A25 + Plan 02-04 Task 3: A26+A27+A28 + Plan 03-01: A29 + Plan 03-02: A30 + Plan 03-03: A31 + getManifestVersion)');
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
export {};
|
export {};
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user