Mark
b341a712c0
Replace the loose-EventType grep with a strict-sentinel filter pipeline per RESEARCH Q3 Code Example Pattern 3: - Import IncrementalSource from @rrweb/types (new binding alongside the existing EventType import) - Filter events for (e.type === EventType.IncrementalSnapshot && e.data?.source === IncrementalSource.Mutation) - Descend into each filtered event's data.adds[*].node.textContent and search for the page-side-injected 'a29-mutation-sentinel' string - A29.2: assert sentinelEvents.length >= 1 — proves the captured mutation came from OUR injection, not from iana.org leftovers Defense-in-depth preserved: - A29.3: rrweb emitted at least one Meta event (renumbered) - A29.4: rrweb emitted at least one FullSnapshot (renumbered) The previous A29.5 (loose IncrementalSnapshot >=1) is subsumed by the A29.2 strict-sentinel check (which requires IncrementalSnapshot AND Mutation source AND injected sentinel — strictly stronger). Empirical verification (all 33/33 GREEN preserved, A29 flake closed): - npx tsc --noEmit → 0 - npm test → 183/183 GREEN preserved (Plan 04-02 baseline) - npm run test:uat → 33/33 GREEN × 5 consecutive runs - A29 mutationEvents=1 + sentinelEvents=1 in ALL 5 runs (no flake) A29 historical flake rate of ~2/3 (documented Plan 03-02 + 03-03 SUMMARYs) is closed end-to-end: the iana.org leftover DOM mutations no longer satisfy A29 because the strict-sentinel filter requires the EXACT string 'a29-mutation-sentinel' that only the page-side chrome.scripting.executeScript injection produces. Pre-checkpoint bundle gates verified (per feedback-pre-checkpoint- bundle-gates.md): - Gate 1: Tier-1 FORBIDDEN_HOOK_STRINGS — 13/13 sub-tests PASS, count unchanged at 12 - Gate 2: SW CSP-safety — new Function=0, eval=0 (Plan 04-02 baseline) - Gate 3+4: Buffer / window / document counts unchanged from Plan 04-02 (Plan 04-03 modifies tests/ only) - Gate 5: manifest validates clean against locked DEC-011 Amendment 1
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